Tank Tracks to Rangoon Read online

  TANK TRACKS

  TO RANGOON

  TANK TRACKS

  TO RANGOON

  * * *

  THE STORY OF BRITISH ARMOUR IN BURMA

  BRYAN PERRETT

  First published in Great Britain in 1978. First paperback edition 1992.

  Both printed by St Edmundsbury Press Limited, Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk.

  Reprinted in this format in 2014 by

  PEN &SWORD MILITARY

  An imprint of

  Pen & Sword Books Ltd

  47 Church Street

  Barnsley, South Yorkshire

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  Copyright © Bryan Perrett 1978, 1992, 2014

  ISBN 978-1-78383-115-9

  The right of Bryan Perrett to be identified as Author

  of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the

  Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

  A CIP catalogue record for this book is

  available from the British Library

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  Contents

  Foreword

  Acknowledgements

  1 Briefing

  2 The Armies which Passed in the Night

  3 A Long Road to a Barren Hillside

  4 ‘Not Fit to Fight In’

  5 U-Go: Overture and Beginners

  6 U-Go: The Siege

  7 U-Go: Relief and Pursuit

  8 Firm Base for a Deadly Thrust

  9 The Master Stroke

  10 The Battle of the Irrawaddy Bend

  11 The End in Arakan

  12 Two Roads to Rangoon

  Appendix A –Some Notes on the Imperial Japanese Armoured Corps

  Appendix B – Brief Technical Data of Allied Tanks which, Fought in Burma

  Appendix C – Table of Approximately Equivalent Ranks, British and Indian Cavalry

  Bibliography

  Index

  Abbreviations

  AA: Anti-aircraft

  ACP: Armoured Command Post

  AFV: Armoured Fighting Vehicle

  AP: Armour-piercing

  APC: Armoured Personnel Carrier

  CRA: Commander, Royal Artillery

  FOO: Forward Observation Officer

  FTO: Forward Tank Officer

  FUP: Forming-up Point

  HE: High Explosive

  IO: Intelligence Officer

  LAD: Light Aid Detachment

  LCA: Landing Craft Assault

  LCT: Landing Craft Tank

  LMG: Light Machine Gun

  MDS: Main Dressing Station

  MG: Machine Gun

  MMG: Medium Machine Gun

  OP: Observation Post

  SDM: Squadron Dafadar Major (Indian Cavalry Rank)

  SHQ: Squadron Headquarters

  SP: Self-propelled

  SSM: Squadron Sergeant Major

  KOSB: King’s Own Scottish Borderers

  KOYLI: King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry

  PAVO: Prince Albert Victor’s Own Cavalry

  RA: Royal Artillery

  RAC: Royal Armoured Corps

  RE: Royal Engineers

  RTR: Royal Tank Regiment

  Illustrations

  Between pages 128 and 129

  25th Dragoons begin bunker-busting in the Arakan

  Close quarter action at Hill 1070

  B Squadron 3rd Carabiniers and 1st Dogras begin to climb Nunshigum

  British infantry, supported by Lees, clear a village during the Imphal battle

  An historic meeting

  Waiting to cross. A troop of 7th Light Cavalry preparing to cross the Irrawaddy

  A Carabinier Lee comes ashore in 2nd Division’s bridgehead

  On the road to Mandalay

  Tanks of 150 Regiment RAC, with Mandalay hill

  A Sherman of the Royal Deccan Horse in action at Yewe

  The Carabiniers support an infantry attack

  The dash to Rangoon

  Maps

  1 Situation at Taukkyon, night of 7th/8th March

  2 The longest retreat: the route from Rangoon to Imphal

  3 Actions fought in the Prome area

  4 The battle of Yenaungyaung

  5 First and Second Arakan Campaigns

  6 The Imphal Plain

  7 The battle for Nunshigum

  8 Kohima: actions fought by 149 Regiment RAC

  9 4 Corps’ operations aimed at Meiktila

  10 The capture of Meiktila

  11 The battle of the Irrawaddy Bend: 33 Corps Divisional bridgeheads

  12 Arakan – final offensive, 1944–45

  13 The advance on Rangoon

  14 17 Division breaks the enemy front at Pyawbwe

  Foreword

  By

  Major General Ralph Younger, CB, CBE, DSO, MC, DL

  Bryan Perrett, in the Preface to his book about Infantry Tanks in World War II,* wrote that mechanized war in Burma deserved a study of its own. He has followed this up by producing a most interesting and readable story of the activities of those armoured regiments, British and Indian, who fought in Burma and North East India between 1942 and 1945. He has taken a great deal of trouble to make contact with many of those who served there, and the story of their exploits makes exciting reading.

  The fighting in Burma, and on its borders, lasted for three years, but not continuously. Armour was involved in the spring of 1942, briefly in the spring of 1943, and on an increasing scale in the whole of 1944 and the spring of 1945. It is fair to say that in all the three major campaigns in which tanks took part, they had an effect out of all proportion to their numbers.

  7th Armoured Brigade arrived in Burma at the end of February 1942, just after the disaster at the Sittang Bridge. This was the decisive battle of the first campaign, and when it was lost there was no hope of saving Rangoon. When it did fall, on 9th March, the whole army in Burma was cut off from the outside world, and what followed, inevitably, was a withdrawal of some 600 miles to India before the monsoon came in May. The task of the 7th Armoured Brigade was to act as covering troops, and to deal with the Japanese tactics of encirclement and infiltration. These tactics nearly always obtained surprise, as there was at no time information from any source about enemy movements.

  During the withdrawal, which lasted for two months, there were four major crises, and a number of minor ones. In every case 7th Armoured Brigade was called in to avert disaster, and invariably did so. When, at last, it reached the Chindwin there was no way of getting the tanks over the river, and they were destroyed; they were still in the same place two years later. There can be little doubt that without 7th Armoured Brigade, described by the Corps Commander, General Slim, as a magnificent formation,
the Army would not have got out of Burma.

  Tanks were next used in the Arakan early in 1943 when a small detachment of Valentines was sent at short notice from Ranchi to take part in an attack on Donbaik which had already failed twice. The attack failed again, the tanks were knocked out, and their crews killed. This unfortunate affair had the effect of encouraging those pundits in India who were already saying that tanks would be no use in any attempt to recapture Burma.

  In the autumn of 1943, 14th Army was formed under General Slim, and greatly improved communications between India and Assam enabled two regiments, one of Lee/Grants, the other of Stuarts, to be sent to Imphal, while another regiment of the former went to the Arakan. In the past the Japanese bunker, with its very strong head cover, was impervious to mortars and field artillery, and therefore very difficult to deal with, but trials showed that it could be broken up by solid shot from the 75 mm of the Lee/Grant. As tanks were to be used at Kohima as well as at Imphal and in the Arakan in the next month or two, this was a valuable discovery, particularly if their role was to be close support of infantry. It was seldom possible to deploy more than a few tanks in any one place, as the Japanese almost invariably occupied positions either in villages or on the top of high hills. However, when even one tank got close enough to the Japanese position, and was covered by fire from infantry, it was generally decisive, as the Japanese did not use mines to any great extent, and they did not possess a good anti-tank gun.

  The Japanese attacked in the Arakan in February, and in March at Imphal and Kohima, where the major fighting took place. In all three areas, the three regiments of tanks greatly distinguished themselves, and were generally fighting as squadrons and sometimes as troops, in close support of infantry. By the end of the battle at Imphal, General Giffard, the Army Group Commander, wrote a letter to General Slim the Army Commander, which contained these words:

  ‘The Royal Armoured Corps and Indian Armoured Corps had silenced all their critics, and had no greater admirers than the infantry who they had supported so staunchly, and with whom they had co-operated so closely and skilfully.’

  By July 1944 the Japanese 15th Army had been completely defeated and the way was open for the Allies to reconquer Burma during the dry weather. For this campaign 254 Tank Brigade, two of whose regiments had fought at Imphal, received a third regiment, of Lee/Grants, 150 RAC and joined 33 Corps. 255 Tank Brigade, who were fresh, and consisted of two Indian cavalry regiments, Probyn’s and the Royal Deccan Horse, as well as 116 Regiment RAC, had Shermans and went to 4 Corps. Another regiment of Indian Cavalry, the 19th Lancers, was sent to the Arakan.

  It was not possible to get the two brigades forward from Imphal till the roads were improved and the ground had dried out after the monsoon, but by the end of January 1945 254 Brigade was approaching the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay, while 255 Brigade were on their way to their crossing place, Pakokku, far to the south, where they were to cross and capture the Japanese communication centre at Meiktila.

  Early in March the armour really came into its own. On the left 33 Corps had crossed the Irrawaddy both sides of Mandalay, while 4 Corps had seized Meiktila. Both Corps were using strong columns of armour and infantry to throw the enemy into confusion. Soon the Japanese had lost almost all their armour, most of their guns, and much of their transport. The columns were very boldly handled, and operated in reasonably open country. By the end of the month, with the monsoon five weeks away, the Japanese had lost their cohesion and it seemed possible to reach Rangoon.

  Early in April, after some re-grouping, one of the greatest pursuits in the history of British arms was started. 4 Corps, with 255 Brigade in the lead, took the axis of the road and railway by way of Toungoo, while 33 Corps with 254 Brigade took the line of the Irrawaddy. By 1st May 4 Corps had reached Pegu, only forty miles from Rangoon, where they were held up by extensive demolition and the start of the monsoon, and 33 Corps had reached Magwe. On 3rd May Rangoon fell to a combined operation organized by 15 Corps from the Arakan.

  * Through Mud and Blood published by Robert Hale.

  Acknowledgements

  To the best of my knowledge and belief, Major-General Ralph Younger, CB, CBE, DSO, MC, DL, is the only officer of the Royal Armoured Corps to have served throughout the campaign in Burma. Landing at Rangoon as second-in-command of 7th Queen’s Own Hussars, he took part in the long retreat to India, went on to command the 3rd Carabiniers during the vital Imphal battle, and was second-in-command of 255 Tank Brigade, which carried out the decisive thrust at Meiktila and led the spectacular dash to Rangoon in 1945. I am greatly honoured that he has written the Foreword to this book, and most grateful for the many hours of work that he has given to the project, for his invaluable advice and his most generous assistance in innumerable ways.

  I should also like to express my appreciation to the following for their advice and time spent on my behalf: General Sir Philip Christison, GBE, CB, DSO, MC, DL; General J. N. Chaudhuri, OBE; Lt-General K. K. Singh; Major-General Sir Reginald Scoones, KBE, CB, DSO; Major-General C. E. Pert, CB, DSO; Major-General A. S. Vaidya, MVC, AVSM; Major-General Virendra Singh; Major-General Rajender Singh Sparrow, MVC; Brigadier J. H. P. Woodroffe; Brigadier H. M. Ley, CBE, DL; Brigadier Sheodan Singh, AVSM, MC; Brigadier S. M. Vohra, SM, Military Adviser to Indian High Commission, London; Brigadier M. Hussein, Military Attaché, Embassy of Pakistan, London; to Colonel J. M. Ashton, Major the Baron Dimsdale, MC, Major V. Pashley and ORQMS Knowles, late of 3rd Carabiniers; to Colonel C. T. Llewellen Palmer, MC, Colonel Marcus Fox, MC; Colonel J. F. Astley-Rushton, Colonel the Rev. N. S. Metcalfe, DSO, QHC, CF, Lt-Colonel G. S. B. Palmer, MC, Lt-Colonel J. Congreve, DSO, OBE, Captain M. J. E. Patteson, MC, MA, M.M. Stanley-Evans, Esq, MC, of 7th Queen’s Own Hussars; to Lt-Colonel Keith Ecclestone, 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, for permitting access to the Regiment’s papers; to Lt-Colonel J. Blackater and Major F. J. R. Moir, MC of 116 Regiment RAC (The Gordon Highlanders); to Lt-Colonel F. W. B. Good, RTR, formerly commanding officer of 149 Regiment RAC (KOYLI); Colonel D. H. Mudie, (Royal Deccan Horse); Major O. H. M. Herford, Captain P. H. Rising, JP, Captain H. Travis and Mrs Edith Barlow, 7th Light Cavalry; Lt-Colonel F. H. Joyner, MC, TD, Major F. B. Boyd and Captain G. H. Brown, 11th (Prince Albert Victor’s Own) Light Cavalry; Colonel G. H. Critchley, Lt-Colonel E. R. McM. Wright, OBE, MC, and Major A. B. Merriam, 19th (King George V’s Own) Lancers.

  I am also grateful to Colonel Peter Hordern of the RAC Tank Museum for his kind advice on the Imperial Japanese Armoured Corps and its vehicles; to Messrs Michael Joseph Ltd for permission to quote from John Master’s book, The Road Past Mandalay; to Messrs Rupert Hart-Davis for permission to use extracts from Lt-Colonel Miles Smeeton’s A Change of Jungles; to the Editor of The Tank magazine for the use of the poem included in Chapter Three; and to many others, who have helped me along the way.

  May 1977 Bryan Perrett

  1

  Briefing

  Once, within my father’s lifetime, the streets of Yokohama were bright with Union Jacks, and across the world the peoples of the British Empire toasted, with equal enthusiasm if differing motives, ‘the plucky little Jap’ who had defeated his clumsy but formidable Russian opponent both on land and at sea.

  The Japanese, emerging from centuries of isolation, had brought their medieval country into the twentieth century with frightening speed, and had shown an amazing capacity to adapt, choosing their instructors from the best the world had to offer, basing their army on that of Imperial Germany, and their navy upon the British Royal Navy.

  During their 1905 war with Russia they had enjoyed the initiative, and the moral support of Great Britain, from the outset. Never particularly enthusiastic about the Russians, the British had been quite ready to wade in on Japan’s side when the Tsar’s Baltic Fleet, suffering a bad attack of jitters in the North Sea, had engaged and sunk a number of their fishing boats. In the months that passed, the Japanese had enjoyed the Tsar’s humiliating public apology and substantial indemnity almost
as much as the British had revelled in the news that Admiral Togo had sent the same fleet to the bottom of the Tsushima Straits.

  The ‘Trafalgar of the East’ placed Japan firmly amongst the World Powers, and completed the process she had begun several years earlier in sending a contingent to join the international force combating the Boxers in China. When war broke out in August 1914, her naval treaty with Great Britain was honoured punctiliously, her warships providing escorts for British convoys and assisting in the search for von Spee’s East Asiatic Squadron, whilst her army captured Germany’s only colony on the Chinese mainland, the port of Tsingtao; to further the allied cause, she even handed back to Russia several elderly relics which had preferred surrender to sinking at Tsushima.

  With the end of the Great War came the first signs of deterioration in the hitherto happy Anglo-Japanese relationship. The United States, pursuing a well intentioned policy of international disarmament, succeeded not only in limiting the number of capital ships available to each major power, but also in achieving the abandonment of the mutually beneficial understanding on spheres of naval influence which had bound Great Britain and Japan together. The Japanese delegation left the Washington Naval Conference feeling that their nation had lost ‘face’, a most important Oriental concept which in essence means that in any confrontation one should emerge with the honours at least even, and they blamed the British for not standing up to American pressures. From now on, Japan would be more circumspect in her dealings with the West.

  However, other factors were at work as well. The curse of industrialization had by now taken root in Japan, and the British found themselves competing in once traditionally safe markets against a flow of low priced goods, a situation which in turn did little to endear their former allies to them.

  Inside Japan, industrialization inevitably led to a steeply rising birthrate in an already crowded environment, and this in turn provided the driving force for outward expansions in the search for what the Germans called lebensraum. A political hierarchy dominated by military caste, and a long list of foreign ventures brought to a successful conclusion by force of arms, showed how this objective would be attained, and it was therefore no surprise to the world when the Manchurian imbroglio turned into full scale war on China, provoked on the flimsiest of excuses.