Impossible Victories Read online

  The arrival of reinforcements was greeted with a thin cheer by Scott’s regiments. Soon after, prolonged cheering from the British line indicated the arrival of the first units of Colonel Hercules Scott’s column and American morale sank anew. Both commanders now made preparations to renew the battle. Drummond withdrew the Royal Scots from their exposed position, extended his line to the right with the 103rd and 104th as they came up and added the column’s three 6-pounders to the guns on the hill. Darkness was now complete save for a moon that struggled to penetrate the slowly dispersing clouds of powder smoke. In these circumstances most commanders would have taken additional precautions for the security of their guns, either by posting pickets ahead of them or absorbing them into the line. Drummond unfortunately did neither, with near fatal consequences.

  For his part, Brown was faced with only two alternatives. Confronted with an enemy present in superior strength and the virtual destruction of Scott’s brigade, he could withdraw; or, he could renew the assault, using the darkness to conceal his approach, and capture the hill which dominated the British position. Taking a finely calculated risk he decided upon the latter, using Ripley’s regulars.

  Since Chippewa, Ripley’s brigade had been reinforced with Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Nicholas’ 1st (now 3rd) Infantry, just 150 men strong. It was decided that this regiment should mount a diversionary attack while Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Miller’s 21st Infantry, which was regarded as the best in the division, advanced obliquely on the hill and carried it with the bayonet, supported on their right by the 23rd Infantry under Major Daniel McFarland and Jesup’s 25th.

  Save in detail, the plan worked. The sound of the 1st Infantry’s approach was detected by Maclachlane’s gunners who engaged the regiment with canister, inflicting casualties and forcing it to pull back to the base of the hill. The noise, however, had masked all other sound and the gunners’ night vision had been impaired by their own muzzle flashes, so that the approach of the 21st Infantry from the south-east went undetected. Before the gun crews knew what was happening, the Americans had rested their muskets on the cemetery’s rail fence, fired a volley, and were coming at them with the bayonet. Some were killed and others were captured, but the rest made off, taking with them the rammers, sponges, buckets and handspikes in accordance with standard procedure, thereby rendering the guns useless to their captors. Alarmed by the sudden uproar, the artillery horse teams bolted through the ranks of the 89th, scattering them. Colonel Morrison, however, was a Peninsula veteran. He quickly restored order and, in conjunction with the light companies of the 41st and the King’s, the 89th mounted a series of local counter-attacks with the object of recovering the guns. These failed, largely because the clutter of limbers and ammunition wagons parked on Lundy’s Lane broke up the British line before it could come to grips. On Miller’s right, however, McFarland’s 23rd Infantry, a regiment more used to defeat than victory and seriously lacking in self-confidence, bolted as soon as it came under fire. Nevertheless, on this occasion the officers took hold, rallied their men and led them back into the line. On the American right flank Jesup’s 25th took up position to the north-west of the crossroads. By 21:45 the Americans were in firm possession of the objective with their line running approximately along Lundy’s Lane. The position was consolidated by the arrival of Biddle’s artillery company with the 25th, Towson’s with the 23rd and Ritchie’s with the 1st, which had come up on the left of the 21st. Porter’s militia brigade came up on the American left and, halting short of the lane, presented a partially refused flank to the west.

  Drummond’s line now ran obliquely from north-east to south-west, two-thirds being north of Lundy’s Lane and one-third to the south. Those south of the lane, including most of the 103rd, two companies of the 104th, three companies of Royal Scots, five companies of Kingsmen and the Glengarry Light Infantry, who had been fired upon by their own side as they withdrew during the confusion, actually overlapped the American line by several hundred yards and were in a position to deliver a decisive riposte, despite the presence of Scott’s survivors, had Drummond been aware of the fact. Unfortunately, because of the darkness and the extremely fluid situation, he was not. The one thought uppermost in his mind was the recovery of his guns and to achieve this he mounted three frontal attacks in succession, using all his troops north of the lane. Each of these brought the opposing battle lines to within point-blank range of the other for periods of approximately 30 minutes before the British fell back. During the last attack some of 89th, commanded by Major Miller Clifford, actually got among the captured guns and bayonets were crossed in vicious hand-to-hand fighting until the regimental buglers blew Retire.

  So close were the contending lines that muzzle flashes clearly revealed the buttons and the whites of eyes in powder-blackened faces opposite. Darkness thickened by dense smoke often prevented the combatants from identifying each other until the last possible moment, the colour of their uniforms being invisible and the shape of their shakos being almost identical; often, the only means of identification was a brief illumination of the differing metal shako plates. The common language also added to the confusion; some men became captives because of it, while others escaped capture. British prisoners were led into the church through a door at one end of the building and escaped by climbing through a window at the other.

  Most of the senior officers present were wounded. Drummond was hit in the neck shortly after the loss of his guns but remained in action despite losing a great deal of blood. Towards the end of the battle a ball passed through Brown’s right thigh. Jesup received no less than four wounds. Ripley and Porter both had narrow escapes that left their uniforms holed and torn.

  By now Scott’s brigade had been reorganised into a single composite unit under Colonel Hugh Brady. Brown’s intention was that it should remain in reserve behind Ripley’s brigade and be used to administer ‘the finishing blow to the enemy at some favourable moment, when we could more distinctly see our way;’ which, of course, would not be before first light. At about 23:00, however, Scott decided to act on his own initiative by attempting to break the British line with an attack in column. His intention was to take the brigade through the American line between the 21st and 23rd then turn west along Lundy’s Lane until he had reached a point on Porter’s left, from whence he would launch his attack. He later claimed that he had warned Ripley’s regiments of this but clearly his message, if it got through, was misunderstood, for no sooner had his brigade entered the lane than it was heavily fired upon by both sides. Scott had his second horse killed beneath him and the column, badly cut up, broke and fled westward until it was rallied on Porter’s left. Even then he refused to abandon his plan and started to lead the survivors against what he believed to be the British flank. To his left the 103rd, 104th and Royal Scots quickly detected the movement and sent volley after volley thudding into the column’s ranks until it withdrew. By now there were many, even in this superbly disciplined brigade, who had begun to doubt their commander’s judgement and only one hundred or so men remained in its ranks. Sensing the mood, Scott made his way across the American rear to the 25th and was talking to Jesup when he was incapacitated by a musket ball through the shoulder.

  By midnight both armies had fought themselves to the point of exhaustion. As the firing died away Brown was assured by some of his officers that not only had the British gone but also that he had won a great victory. He took no steps to verify the former and if he believed the latter he must have known it was pyrrhic in character. Knowing that Scott’s brigade had all but ceased to exist, that his guns were out of ammunition, that casualties had reduced the 25th Infantry to a single rank, that Porter’s brigade had already broken once, that the infantry had been reduced to collecting cartridges from the dead and that there were probably no more than 800 men holding the line, he was well aware that his army could not withstand another attack. Exhaustion and the pain of his wound combined to dull his judgement and, agreeing to a suggestion that the troops sh
ould withdraw to the camp at Chippewa for food and rest, he designated Ripley as commander and left the field. On his instructions the American artillery had already pulled back, save for a damaged 5½-inch howitzer and one 6-pounder gun in Towson’s company which had to be left behind because no horse teams were available. For the same reason, all but one of the captured British guns were left where they were. Most of the wounded were loaded into wagons and finally the weary infantry formed column and marched back along the river road to Chippewa. When Ripley arrived at the camp he was disgusted to find that, by his estimation, it already contained about 1,000 men, many of whom had left the line with the excuse of escorting wounded comrades to the rear. Visiting Brown in his tent, he was ordered by the latter to return to the battlefield at dawn and bring away the rest of the captured guns.

  Drummond had merely retired his troops a few hundred yards into the darkness. He was aware of his own heavy losses but he knew that Brown’s were probably heavier. He was also absolutely determined to recover his guns, without which he would be at a fatal disadvantage in future engagements, and his weary troops, some units of which had not been involved in the previous night’s counter-attacks, fully expected the battle to be rejoined next morning. At first light they formed up and began to move forward, To their surprise and pleasure they encountered no opposition whatever and by 07:00 they were in possession of the hill, now strewn with the casualties of both sides and the carcasses of dead horses. All save one of their guns were recovered, plus the two abandoned by Towson. While part of his division set about collecting the wounded for despatch to Fort George and collecting the dead for burial or cremation, Drummond pushed a strong detachment south to Willson’s Tavern. Here, at about 10:00, the Americans appeared from the direction of Chippewa, but after a period during which each side regarded the other without opening fire, they turned about and disappeared.

  Despite Brown’s orders, Ripley was well aware that the Left Division was in no condition to fight another major action. It was not, in fact, until 09:00 that the three brigades, with only 1,500 men between them, left the camp at Chippewa. The attitude of officers and men left Ripley in no doubt that a renewal of the contest was far from welcome and, when his light troops sent back an inaccurate report to the effect that the British detachment at Willson’s Tavern outnumbered him he had no hesitation in convening a council of war. When Porter, Towson and others concurred with his view that the division should withdraw to Fort Erie he returned to Chippewa. Brown was furious but, being on the point of being evacuated to Buffalo with Scott and other wounded officers, reluctantly accepted the majority decision. By 15:00 the Left Division had broken camp and, having thrown its non-transportable supplies into the river, was marching south to Fort Erie, vindictively burning Bridgewater Mills before it left.

  Lundy’s Lane was the most bitterly contested battle of the war. Drummond’s casualty return included 84 killed, 559 wounded, 42 men known to be prisoners and 193 missing, a total of 878. Again, Donald Graves’ research, taking into account the American listing of 169 British prisoners, suggests a lower overall figure, probably in the region of 800. Brown reported 173 killed, 571 wounded and 117 missing, a total of 860. The much higher proportion of American dead stemmed largely from the needless immolation of Scott’s brigade, which incurred the loss of 109 killed, 350 wounded and 57 missing.

  Opinions as to who won the Battle of Lundy’s Lane have been divided ever since. Certainly Brown was the tactical victor at midnight, but his decision to abandon the field and with it the captured artillery forfeited his success. He may have assumed, without any real justification, that the battle was over. Against this, and despite his orders for Ripley to return the following morning, he appeared to accept, subconsciously at least, that the Left Division had been fought to its limits. For his part, Drummond could not afford to accept that the battle was over. Both he and his troops were prepared to resume the action at dawn, which the Americans were not. Had the latter chosen to remain on the position overnight, the coming of light would have revealed the full extent of their weakness. The probability is that, after resisting for a while, they would have been driven off the field by Drummond’s superior numbers and his ability to manoeuvre against their flanks. Such thoughts must have been running through Brown’s mind and in the circumstances his decision to abandon the field was the correct one.

  A week later, Drummond followed up the Left Division’s withdrawal to Fort Erie, which he found had been strengthened by newly constructed earthworks. On 14 August an attempt to storm the defences proved abortive when a powder magazine blew up with heavy loss of life. The following month Drummond decided to abandon the siege, for which he was ill-equipped.7 On 17 September, as his guns were being pulled out of their emplacements, the Americans mounted a major sortie. This was repulsed after each side had sustained in excess of 500 casualties, and he withdrew to the Chippewa line. Having been reinforced with their Right Division, the Americans closed up but were unable to make further progress. By the beginning of November the new American commander on the Niagara front, Major-General George Izard, had become anxious to obtain winter quarters for his troops and, having already retired to Fort Erie, and blown up its entrenchments, his troops crossed to the United States. So ended the last American invasion of Canada.

  Elsewhere, the scales had begun to tilt against the United States as Wellington’s Peninsula veterans began reaching North America in large numbers. During the absence of Izard and his Right Division on the Niagara front Prevost launched an invasion of New York state with 10,000 men and was only prevented from advancing beyond Plattsburg when the British lost control of Lake Champlain. However, with the war now entering its third year, the American militia proved as unreliable as ever. Fighting from within entrenchments, they were able to repulse British attacks on Baltimore in September and New Orleans the following January, but in the open field they remained incapable of standing up to regular troops. At Bladensburg on 24 August 1814 some 6,000 of them, commanded by same incompetent Major-General William Winder who has featured earlier in these pages, were routed and put to flight in a matter of minutes by only 1,500 British regulars, the advance guard of a 5,400-strong landing force commanded by Major-General Robert Ross. Continuing their advance, Ross’s troops entered Washington, which they occupied for two days, burning the public buildings in reprisal for American depredations on the Niagara front.8 They then marched back to their ships, virtually unmolested. As a result of this Secretary of War Armstrong was replaced by James Monroe, a future President of the United States.

  The time had come to make peace. The war was producing no benefits for either side and with Napoleon now in temporary exile on Elba the Continental System, one of its primary causes, no longer existed. Despite the continued failings of the militia, the news of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane strengthened the somewhat weak hand of the American peace commissioners, since it proved that the United States could produce regular troops capable of meeting the best in the world on even terms. A peace treaty, based on the status quo ante-bellum, was concluded at Ghent on 24 December.

  Many of the officers who served with the Left Division achieved high rank and profoundly influenced the Army’s development during the next half century. Brown became General-in-Chief in 1821, but poor health and bad investments marred his later years; he died in 1828, aged 52. Scott ended the war as a brevet major-general. For the next 30 years he concentrated on the introduction of sound training methods, taking the French Army as his model. In 1846 he commanded the American army during its successful campaign in Mexico. He, too, became General-in-Chief and was still serving when the Civil War broke out. He devised the Anaconda Plan for the crushing of the Confederacy but, sickened by political interference in the army’s affairs, he retired in November 1861. Ripley also ended the war as a brevet major-general but became involved in an acrimonious feud with Brown and left the army in 1820. Porter returned to politics and held the post of Secretary for War for a year during the
presidency of John Quincy Adams. Towson became Paymaster General in 1819 and held the post for 34 years, retiring with the rank of major-general; in 1848 he presided over a court of inquiry into Scott’s disbursement of public funds in Mexico. Jesup ended the war as a brevet colonel. In 1818 he was promoted brigadier-general and appointed Quartermaster General, a post he was still holding when he died in 1860.